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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
This Court has jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to a 
letter dated July 8, 1987, from the Clerk of the Utah Supreme 
Court, delegating this case to this Court. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal and cross-appeal from findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, and judgment entered in a civil action in the 
Third Judicial District Court by the Honorable Scott Daniels on 
March 20, 1987. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. When the Trial Judge enters Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law which have been discussed, reviewed, modified, 
and then approved by attorneys for both parties, may one of those 
parties then file an appeal based upon a challenge to those very 
Findings without marshalling all of the evidence supporting the 
Trial Court's Findings and then demonstrating why those findings 
should not be accorded the presumption in favor of their being 
sustained? 
2. Should this Court reverse or alter the trial courtfs 
findings of fact which are supported by competent and substantial 
evidence in the record? 
3. Assuming that the trial court's findings of fact in 
4 
this case are supported by substantial and competent evidence in 
the record, are the conclusions of law founded thereon justified 
and consistent with other law? 
4. With respect to Plaintiff-Respondent Monroe's cross-
appeal, does the Utah Unlawful Detainer statute (Utah Code §§78-
36-10 (2) and (3)) required that the damages incurred by the 
property owner be trebled? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AND OTHER PROVISIONS 
The following are determinative regulation and statutory 
provisions: 
29 C.F.R. §785.23: 
Employees residing on employer's premises or working at 
home. 
An employee who resides on his employer's 
premises on a permanent basis or for extended 
periods of time is not considered as working 
all the time he is on the premises. 
Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private 
pursuits and thus have enough time for 
eating, sleeping, entertaining, and other 
periods of complete freedom from all duties 
when he may leave the premises for purposes 
of his own. It is of course difficult to 
determine the exact hours worked under these 
circumstances and any reasonable agreement of 
the parties which takes into consideration 
all of the pertinent facts will be accepted. 
This rule would apply, for example, to the 
pumper of a stripper well who resides on the 
premises of his employer and also to a 
telephone operator who has the switchboard in 
her own home. Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 
Okla. 183, 148. P.2d 182 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 
1944); Thompson v. Loring Oil Co.., 50 F. 
5 
Supp. 213 (W.D.La. 1943) 
Utah Code 78-36-10 (2) and (3). 
(2) The jury, or the court, if the 
proceeding is tried without a jury or upon 
the defendant's default, shall also assess 
the damages resulting to the plaintiff from 
any of the following: (a) forcible entry; 
(b) forcible or unlawful detainer; (c) waste 
of the premises during defendant's tenancy, 
if waste is alleged in the complaint and 
proved at trial; and (d) the amount of rent 
due, if the alleged unlawful detainer is 
after default in the payment of rent. 
(3) The judgment shall be entered against 
the defendant for the rent, for three times 
the amount of the damages assessed under 
Subsections (2)(a) through (2)(c), and for 
reasonable attorneysfs fees, if they are 
provided for in the lease or agreement. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case: 
This action was initially commenced in the Circuit Court by 
Plaintiff-Respondent Monroe, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
"Monroe"), as an unlawful detainer action, seeking to evict the 
Defendant-Appellant (hereinafter, "Sidwell"), whose employment as 
a security person for Monroe had been terminated several months 
earlier. 
A petition for an order of restitution in favor of Monroe 
was filed. Sidwell filed an answer, asserting that Monroe had 
harassed her and caused her $515,000.00 in general and punitive 
damages. The case was transferred to the District Court. Monroe 
pursued the order of restitution, which was granted. Sidwell 
then filed an amended answer and counterclaim against Monroe, 
asserting a claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 
§201, et seq. ("FLSA"), and seeking approximately $100,000.00 in 
damages. 
Course of the Proceedings: 
The case was set for trial before the Honorable Judge Scott 
Daniels, who tried the matter without a jury on March 2 and 3, 
1987. At the close of the evidence and after hearing the 
arguments of counsel, Judge Daniels ruled in favor of Monroe and 
against Sidwell and directed Monroe's counsel to prepare an order 
and submit it after presenting it to opposing counsel for 
approval as to form. Transcript of Proceedings (included in the 
Record at page 224 and referred to herein as "Tr.") 300-03. 
Monroe submitted proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law 
to which Sidwell objected. After informal consultation between 
counsel, a second revised set of proposed findings of fact and 
conclusions of law were submitted. Again, Sidwell objected. R. 
204-07. Sidwell submitted her own proposed supplemental findings 
and conclusions. R. 208-11. Judge Daniels held a conference to 
review the submissions by both counsel during which conference 
the attorneys agreed as to the wording which would be used in the 
final version of the findings and conclusions. See Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law attached as a part of the Appendix to 
Sidwell's Brief. 
After entry of the Judgment on March 20, 1987, Sidwell filed 
a notice of appeal on April 17, 1987, alleging that the trial 
court erred in denying relief for the asserted FLSA claims. 
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R.212. Monroe filed a cross appeal on April 27, 1987, asserting 
that the trial court erred in not trebling the damages under the 
initial unlawful detainer claim. R.214. 
Disposition of Trial Court: 
As indicated above, the Trial Court entered judgment in 
favor of Monroe on the claim for unlawful detainer in the amount 
of $300. The Trial Court also entered judgment in favor of 
Monroe and against Sidwell on the FLSA counterclaim. R.202. 
Relevant Facts: 
The testimony in this case was conflicting at many points. 
The Trial Court was required to weigh that testimony and make 
factual determinations. In setting forth the relevant facts in 
this Brief, Monroe has taken the Findings of Fact as reviewed and 
approved as to form by counsel and adopted by the Trial Court and 
has added citations to the Record or Transcript of the 
Proceedings to show that Judge Daniels1 Findings were all based 
upon the evidence before him. These Findings and the supporting 
citations are set forth in full because of the Appellant's 
attempt to ignore the material and relevant facts as found by the 
Trial Court. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to the 
Utah Forcible Entry and Unlawful Detainer Act, §§78-36-
1 to 12.6, Utah Code Annotated. Defendant answered and 
asserted by way of counterclaim causes of action under 
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the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201, et seq. 
(hereinafter, the "FLSA"). R.93-95; R.48-75. 
2. At the time of the commencement of the action 
herein, plaintiff was a Delaware corporation doing 
business in Utah and Idaho, with places of business in 
Salt Lake County, Utah, among other places. Tr. 300. 
3. Since at least January, 1982, plaintiff's 
yearly gross sales has exceeded $250,000. Tr. 300. 
4. Defendant, M. Timmie Sidwell, is an individual 
who was employed by plaintiff as a security person at 
the plaintiff's Cottonwood Heights sand and gravel 
location in Salt Lake County from February 8, 1982, 
through March 31, 1986. Tr. 106. 
5. When defendant was hired, the plaintiff and 
defendant agreed that she would be paid $355 per month 
[Tr. 42] and would live in a mobile home located on the 
premises in a space provided by the plaintiff with 
utilities [Tr.42-43; 163-64] (gas, electricity, water, 
and septic tank [Ex. P-16]) furnished by the employer 
as further consideration for her services; it was 
understood that defendant would either rent or buy the 
mobile home in which she lived [Tr. 42]. 
6. In addition to residing on the premises, the 
purpose of which was to provide a presence to 
discourage and deter trespassers [Tr. 141; 158; 166-
67], defendant was also assigned certain specific 
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duties which included ensuring that the gates to the 
property were locked [R.247], making one limited round 
each week-day and an additional two rounds [R.248; Tr. 
52; Ex. P-ll] on weekends and holidays, preparing 
periodic reports [Tr. 180], and occasionally performing 
other minor miscellaneous functions (including turning 
a pump switch on [Tr. 166; R.247], and checking a pilot 
light on windy days [R.272]) if she were available to 
do so [Tr. 250]; defendant had no other specific duties 
after daylight hours [Tr. 144; Ex. P-ll] or when other 
Monroe personnel were on the premises [Tr. 143; 146; 
161-62; Ex. P-ll]; other than her rounds, defendant was 
not expected to keep any regular watch [Tr. 141; 146] 
or surveillance over the property but was merely asked 
to report any trespassing or vandalism which should 
happen to come to her attention. 
7. Plaintiff and defendant agreed that defendant 
would reside on the premises [Tr. 42], although it was 
not a condition of her employment that she be present 
on the premises on a full-time basis or during any 
certain times [Tr. 141; 162; 250; 267; R.252] (except 
to perform some of her specific duties, the timing of 
some of which assignments was freely altered by 
defendant from time to time). 
8. On one occasion when defendant was absent from 
the premises for several days, she arranged at her own 
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expense to have a another person live in the mobile 
home while she was away, but there was no showing that 
the duties of the other person were any different from 
those of defendant during said period. R.265. 
9. On the occasion referred to in Finding 8, 
defendant's regular salary was paid without reduction. 
10. Defendant was free to come and go as she 
wished [Tr. 141; 161; 246; 250; 267; R.252], and was 
free to pursue her own individual interests during the 
time she was employed by plaintiff and to use her time 
effectively for her own purposes [Tr. 262] to do such 
things as eat, sleep, go shopping, do personal errands, 
study, write, occasionally attend church and the 
Symphony [Tr. 221-22], accept full-time employment 
during the day [Tr. 183], and, with the prior 
permission of the plaintiff (which was freely given and 
never denied [Tr. 187, 260]), take evening classes at 
the University of Utah [Tr. 165, 179] and on one 
occasion for two or three months accept full-time 
employment which extended until approximately 9:00 p.m. 
on week days [Tr. 194], and engage in other normal 
private pursuits. 
11. Defendant's actual duties under the agreement 
with plaintiff approximated no more than eight to ten 
hours per week [Tr. 54; 57; 151; 165; 254; R.248; Exs. 
P-10, P-12] for which she was paid by plaintiff at 
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rates in excess of the minimum wage required under the 
FLSA; and during the other times when defendant was 
living on the premises, she was not on duty, and those 
times did not constitute hours which were controlled or 
required by the plaintiff or its business [Tr. 243; 
250; 255; 262; 266-67]. 
12. Under all of the circumstances of this case, 
the plaintiff paid the defendant for her hours of work 
at a rate which at all times exceeded the minimum rate 
required by the FLSA [Tr. 255; 269]. 
13. Plaintiff and its representatives did not act 
in careless disregard of the minimum wage or overtime 
compensation provisions of the FLSA and did not 
intentionally, knowingly, or voluntarily take any 
action which violated the minimum wage or overtime 
compensation provisions of the FLSA [Tr. 104; 119-20; 
255; 263; 268; Ex. P-10]. 
14. Plaintiff's representatives acted in good 
faith without being cognizant of any possible violation 
of the minimum wage or overtime compensation provisions 
of the FLSA [Tr. 119-20; 255; 263; 268; Ex. P-10]. 
15. Defendant's employment was terminated by 
notice dated January 28, 1986, to be effective March 
31, 1986, said notice requesting that she vacate the 
premises by the end of March, 1986 [Ex. P-14; and see 
Tr. 44]. 
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16. When defendant failed to vacate by the stated 
date, plaintiff caused that a notice to quit be served 
upon her which was done on April 17, 1986 [R.6; Ex. P-
9]. 
17. The complaint in this action was filed on April 
25, 1986 [R.4], but defendant's mobile home was not removed 
from plaintiff's property until October 30, 1986 [see Tr. 
237] . 
18. The damages thus incurred by plaintiff total 
$300.00, computed by multiplying the reasonable rental 
value of the mobile home space (which the Court finds, 
after considering all the evidence [Tr. 302; 96], to be 
$50.00 per month [Tr. 302]) times six months. 
19. Plaintiff offered evidence that in addition to the 
reasonable rental value of the mobile home space, the 
average monthly value of utilities provided for defendant 
were gas: $30; electricity: $25; water $8; and sewer: $10 
[Ex. P-16]. 
Summary of the Argument: 
The Trial Court's rejection of Sidwell's FLSA claims was 
proper. This case is one which turns primarily on the facts. 
In the preparation of the Trial Court's Findings of Fact, 
attorneys for both parties gave great attention to those 
Findings, working on several drafts before finally submitting an 
approved version to the Trial Court for signature. As indicated 
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in the Statement of Facts, above, each of the Trial Court's 
findings is supported by substantial and competent evidence in 
the record. The Appellant Sidwell has failed to marshal the 
evidence supporting the Trial Court's Findings and has also then 
failed to demonstrate why those Findings should be rejected. 
This Court should not presume to retry the case on appeal, but 
should accept those supported Findings of the Trial Court, 
especially when the contents of those Findings were so carefully 
considered and so strongly supported by the record. The Findings 
of Fact support the Conclusions of Law which the Trial Court also 
adopted after careful consideration by the parties1 attorneys. 
Existing regulations and applicable case law serve as clear 
precedent for the ultimate conclusions of the Trial Court. 
The Trial Court did err, however, when he failed to treble 
the damages sustained by Monroe due to Sidwellfs unlawful 
detainer of the premises. Utah law leaves no discretion for a 
judge in this regard; he must treble damages incurred after the 
notice in an unlawful detainer situation. 
A R G U M E N T 
I. IF THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL COURT ARE SUPPORTED 
IN THE RECORD, THEY MAY NOT BE SET ASIDE ON REVIEW. 
A. The Findings of Fact Which Were Adopted 
by the Trial Court Are All Supported in the Record. 
Monroe has incorporated verbatim all of the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact, adding citations to the Record for each point 
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and subpoint. See above. This detailed approach has been 
followed in this Brief because of the significance of those facts 
to the outcome of this appeal. As those reproduced Findings 
show, each of the Trial Court's findings is premised upon 
substantial and competent evidence in the Record. 
Appellant Sidwell ignores that evidence and argues (Sidwell 
Brief, pp. 14-16) that the Trial Court erroneously found that 
Mrs. Sidwell was not required to be physically present at the 
work site during any specified hours. Attempting to support this 
argument, Sidwell cites three Findings (Nos. 7, 10, and 11), 
emphasizing certain language from each, which Sidwell asserts are 
contrary to the "clear weight of the evidence." This argument 
fails from the outset as the language of the Findings shows. 
Sidwell's Brief points to the following passages as alleged 
error (Brief, pp. 14-15): 
From Finding No. 7: 
it was not a condition of her 
employment that she be present on the 
premises on a full time basis or during any 
certain times (except to perform some of her 
specified duties, the timing of some of which 
assignments was freely altered by Defendant 
from time to time. [Emphasis in Sidwell 
Brief.] 
From Finding No. 10: 
Defendant was free to come and go as she 
wished, . . . . [Emphasis in Sidwell Brief.] 
From Finding No. 11: 
Defendant's actual duties under the agreement 
with Plaintiff approximated no more than 
eight to ten hours per week . . . ; and the 
other times when Defendant was living on the 
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premises did not constitute hours which were 
controlled by the plaintiff or its business. 
[Emphasis in Sidwell Brief.] 
Despite the portions emphasized by Sidwell1s Brief, the 
remainder of the foregoing passages clearly indicates that the 
Trial Court found that some of Mrs. Sidwell's time was indeed 
required on a regular basis. The Trial Court found that she was 
compensated for that time at lawful rates. See Findings No. 11 
and No. 12. 
Sidwell's Brief, however, attempts to mislead the reader by 
suggesting that the Trial Court did not recognize the fact that 
some of Mrs. Sidwell's time was required on a regular basis. The 
misleading assertion is contained in the Brief at pp. 15-16: 
These Findings and Conclusions are 
erroneous for the following two reasons. 
First, the clear weight of the evidence shows 
that Defendant Sidwell was in fact required 
to be physically present at the property 
during certain specified hours during the 
week. . . . 
The Trial Court found (and Monroe does not dispute) that of 
course Mrs. Sidwell was required to be present during certain 
times. This was never contested at the hearing and the Trial 
Court adopted Findings so stating. 
The effort in Sidwell's Brief to mislead is compounded in 
that portion of the Brief which underscores only certain parts of 
Findings 7, 10, and 11. The underscoring fails to include the 
qualifying language, without which the Findings are obviously 
incomplete. For example, Sidwell's Brief does not emphasize the 
words of Finding No. 7 which state that Mrs. Sidwell's presence 
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was not required during any certain times except to perform some 
of her specific duties. Also, in referring to Finding No. 11, 
Sidwell fails to emphasize that her actual duties under the 
agreement with Monroe approximated no more than eight to ten 
hours per week. 
The attempt to mislead is further compounded by other 
statements in the Brief (at pp. 19, 26) which suggest that the 
Trial Court did not find that Mrs. Sidwell!s "presence" around 
her home was anticipated. However, Findings 5, 6, and 7 each 
make reference to the fact that when Mrs. Sidwell was hired she 
was expected to live in the mobile home located on the Monroe 
property. 
Sidwellfs Brief, however, doesn't seem to contest the 
important Finding of the Trial Court that Mrs. Sidwell was not 
required to be on the premises on a full-time basis. Instead, 
Sidwellfs Brief nit-picks the Findings, expecting this Court on 
review to quibble over the degree of freedom which Mrs. Sidwell 
enjoyed while living on the Monroe property. 
In Sidwell's own proposed supplemental findings, Sidwell 
urged the Trial Court to hold that "during normal hours of plant 
operation, Defendant [Sidwell] was completely free to come and go 
as she wished, and was free to pursue her own individual 
interests, including accepting full-time employment with another 
employer and engaging in other normal, private pursuits with 
complete freedom from all duties or responsibilities." [R.209-
10] Thus, Appellant in essence accepted some of the very 
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Findings which she now wishes to contest. 
In making his ruling with respect to the degree of freedom 
enjoyed by Mrs. Sidwell, the Trial Court relied upon the Record, 
which included the following statements (among others): 
(Testimony of Stanton Wilson, Tr. 54) 
Q [by Kennedy] Now, in this document [P-12, 
which was written by Mrs. Sidwell herself], 
did the Defendant [Sidwell] attempt to set 
forth the amount of time that she spent on 
active guard duties each week? 
* * * 
A Yes. Middle of the second page she talks 
about there—well, all the way through it, 
but it culminates there on in Category D, she 
says seven hours and 50 minutes. 
(Testimony of Foreman Bruce Squires, Tr. 141-42) 
Q [by Kennedy] What were those duties? 
A Well, they would vary. There was no set 
routine. When she was hired, she was told 
that what we really wanted on the premises 
was her presence, someone coming and going so 
there would be tire tracks in the snow and on 
the weekends the kids would know there was 
someone around because, you know Monroe had, 
had a problem with, you know the kids on the 
pond. 
Q Did you expect her to be there all the 
time on the weekends? 
A No. . . . And again, verbal, you know, 
number of years ago—I mean, it was in 1980 
or '82, I mean, but—and just told her she 
needed to be there and that so there was a 
presence that she was free to come and go as 
she pleased. 
Q She was free as she pleased? 
A As she pleased. 
Q And you told her that? 
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A Yes. I also recall telling her that, 
though, she is going to be gone, say a couple 
of days, we would like to know about it. And 
then I—or the foreman or someone could make 
some trips down there occasionally, you know, 
just to check. * * * 
(Squires testimony, Tr. 151, 267) 
Q [by Kennedy] Concerning what Mrs. Sidwell 
had indicated as her active guard duties, how 
many hours a week would you estimate would be 
required in performing those active guard 
duties that she defines in her memo [P-12]? 
A Five to ten, maybe. 
* * * 
Q Mr. Squires, you've also been here and 
heard Mrs. Sidwellfs testimony. Did you ever 
place any restrictions on her coming and 
going as a part of her job? 
A No, sir. 
(Testimony of Foreman Darrell Williams, Tr. 162, 164-
65; R. 248, 252): 
Q [by Kennedy] Was it your understanding 
that she was free to come and go as she 
pleased? 
A Yes. 
Q And in fact, she did come and go as she 
pleased, did she not, during the period of 
time that you had responsibility over her 
employment? 
A Yes. 
Q Did you contemplate that she had been 
performing any active guard duties when she 
was asleep? 
A No. 
Q Did you contemplate that she would be 
performing any active guard duties when she 
19 
was at the University attending classes? 
A No. 
Q Did you contemplate that she would be 
performing any active guard duties when she 
was employed full time at another job? 
A No. 
Q In her exhibit that she gave to the 
company, which I think is marked as P-12, she 
indicates that's the total time that she 
spent each week making her active guard 
duties, amounting to about seven hours and 50 
minutes. From your knowledge of her duties, 
does that sound correct to you? Is it high 
or low or how would you characterize her 
estimate? 
A Well, it might be a little high, but I 
couldn't say for certain. 
* * * 
Q Okay. All right. Now, knowing what you 
know about her duties, can you tell the Court 
how much time it would take over the course 
of a week on the average to perform all of 
the duties that she had to do? 
A Five, six hours. Something like that. 
* * * 
Q Okay. Was Mrs. Sidwell ever instructed by 
you that she had to remain awake during the 
night to be on guard? 
A Never. 
Q Was she free to come and go other than the 
one round a day and two rounds on weekends 
that you say she was asked to perform? 
A Yes. 
Q And did she in fact come and go as she 
pleased? 
A Yes. 
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(Mrs. Sidwell's Testimony, Tr. 183, 221-22) 
Q [by Merkling] Why aren't you making a 
claim for those hours then? 
A Because I was told by Mr. Darrell Williams 
when he gave me my job description that I 
would not be responsible for security duties 
or even for my presence on Saturday morning 
until 11:45. 
Q How about the weekdays? 
A On the weekdays, Mr. Darrell Williams, as 
I stated, told me that I was perfectly free 
to get myself a daytime job because it was 
very evident— 
Q Well — 
A Okay. That I was very free to get a 
daytime job, then. 
* * * 
Q [by Kennedy] Mrs. Sidwell, did you, did 
you include in the hours that you've listed 
here as hours worked [for compensation], time 
that you spent that you were actually asleep? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q And you also included time where you were, 
maybe, eating dinner? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q And maybe over the weekends, when you 
eating lunch? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q And other meals? 
A Yes. 
Q You also included the time that you spent 
preparing meals? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
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Q You included time that you spent attending 
to other personal matters; for example, 
taking a bath or shower? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q You included time that you spent even, 
maybe, running some errands? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q And you included time that you spent 
attending church? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q And you included time that you spent 
attending the symphony? 
A Yes. 
* * * 
Q Did you include the time that you spent 
studying for these classes that you attended? 
A Yes, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q In fact, really, you've included time for 
a variety of matters where you were pursuing, 
oh, one personal interest or another in this 
time? 
A I was living there, Mr. Kennedy. 
Q I understand. But you included that, 
havenf t you? 
A Yes, I have. 
(Testimony of another Foreman, Jann Vasey, Tr. 245-46, 250, 
261-62, 266) 
Q [by Kennedy] During that period of time 
[day in and day out basis], were you working 
in a position where you could see what was 
happening on the premises there at the site? 
A Yes, I was. 
Q Did you ever see Mrs. Sidwell make any 
rounds during that period of time? 
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A No, I did not. 
Q You became her supervisor in May of 19— 
let me ask you# did that bother you at all? 
A No. 
Q Why not? 
A To the best of my knowledge she just lived 
there and could come and go as she pleased. 
Q You became her supervisor in May of 1985, 
approximately? 
A Yes. 
Q And at that time did you change her duties 
in any way? 
A No, I did not. 
Q Did you observe whether she made any 
rounds at all after you became her 
supervisor? 
A No, I did not. 
* * * 
Q Did it upset you that she wasn't there 
when you called to have her shut the pump 
off? 
A No, not at all. 
Q Why not? 
A Well, she just lived there. She could 
come and go as she pleased. 
Q Now, did you ever criticize her for not 
being there under these circumstances? 
A No, I did not. 
* * * 
Q When she became a concern of yours, did 
you keep any records of when she was or 
wasn't there? 
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A No, I did not. 
Q Why not? 
A I wasn't that worried about her comings 
and goings. 
Q Did you ever restrict her in any way with 
respect to her comings and goings? 
A No, I did not. 
* * * 
Q Did you ever indicate to Mrs. Sidwell she 
had to get permission in order to leave? 
A No, I did not. 
Q So, on her own she called you and said I'm 
going to be gone? 
A That is correct. 
The final segment of Mr. Vasey's testimony, quoted above, 
was omitted from Sidwell!s Brief, which referred to some 
questions from the Court immediately preceding it. On the basis 
of the partial quotation, Appellant suggested an inconsistency in 
Mr. Vasey's recollection. (Brief p. 23.) That alleged 
inconsistency, however, disappears when Mr. Vasey's complete 
statement is considered. 
Consequently, the Findings of the Trial Court are supported 
by substantial and competent evidence in the record. The 
inadequate attempts by Sidwell's Brief to question a small 
selection of those Findings cannot serve as cause for this Court 
on review to reject those Findings. 
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B. The Credibility of Mrs. Sidwellfs 
Testimony Was Called into Serious Question. 
In addition to the overwhelming weight of the evidence 
supporting the Trial Courtfs Findings, it must be noted that the 
Appellant's main witness (herself) was shown to be unreliable and 
not credible. The following passage from the Transcript 
demonstrates these points: 
THE COURT: Wait a minute. He [Mr. Kennedy] 
just asked you a very simple question. Was 
that the question and the answer on that day 
[when your deposition was taken]? 
THE WITNESS: This is what I said, Mr. 
Kennedy. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
THE WITNESS: This is not what I am willing 
to hold to. 
In addition to such evasive and equivocating testimony, the 
Trial Court also heard the admission from Mrs. Sidwell and her 
attorney that she had been convicted of a crime, theft of 
property from a prior employer. (Tr. 208) That evidence had 
been brought to light by Monroe to impeach the credibility of 
Mrs. Sidwell under the rules of evidence. 
Hence, the Trial Court had more than an adequate basis for 
rejecting all of the contentions asserted by Mrs. Sidwell. She 
simply was not a credible witness. 
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C. Under Accepted Standards of Review, the 
Appellant Sidwell Failed to Meet her Burden 
To Challenge the Trial Court's Findings of 
Fact. 
The Utah Supreme Court and this Court have recently and 
repeatedly restated the standard for appellate review of Findings 
of Fact. That standard is that a reviewing court will not 
overturn a trial Judgefs Findings of Fact unless such Findings 
are clearly erroneous. In viewing the evidence, the reviewing 
court must be left with the definite and firm conviction that a 
mistake has been committed. Ball v. Volken, 741 P. 2d 974, 64 
Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (1987). Findings are presumed valid and correct 
as long as there is sufficient support for them in the evidence. 
Crimson v. Western Company, 742 P.2d 1219, 65 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 
(Ct. App. 1987). A heavy burden rests upon the Appellant to 
marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's Findings and 
then to demonstrate that such evidence, when compared to the 
contrary evidence, is so lacking as to warrant the conclusion 
that clear error has been committed. Newmeyer v. Newmeyer, 69 
Utah Ap. Rep. 32 (1987). This Court has stated that the 
Appellant is required to marshal all of the evidence supporting 
the Trial Judge's Findings. This requirement is neither elective 
nor optional. Nor will the reviewing court perform this task for 
Appellant. Fitzgerald v. Crltchfield, 67 Utah Adv. Rep. 15 (Ct. 
App. 1987). To mount a successful attack on the Trial Court's 
Findings of Fact, Appellant must marshal all the evidence in 
support of the Trial Court's Findings and then demonstrate that 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to the court below, 
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the evidence is insufficient to support the Findings. Id. 
The Fitzgerald case held that it was insufficient for an 
appellant simply to compare one party's version of the facts with 
the other party's version. In Hansen v. Green River Group, 74 
Utah Adv. Rep. 44 (Ct. App. 1988), this Court ruled that 
appellate review is "strictly limited" concerning factual 
findings relating to the parties' intent as it pertains to an 
agreement. Those findings, if supported by substantial, 
competent evidence in the record, will not be disturbed on 
appeal. See, Wilburn v. Interstate Elec, 74 Utah Adv. Rep. 23 
(Ct. App. 1988) This Court also very recently stated in Gillmor 
v. Gillmor, 745 P.2d 461, 68 Utah Adv. Rep. 22 (Ct. App. 1987), 
that the Court presumes the Findings of Fact of the Trial Court 
to be correct. It is not the function of the Appellate Court to 
make Findings of Fact because it does not have the advantage of 
seeing and hearing witnesses testify. On review, this Court 
views the evidence and all the references that can reasonably be 
drawn therefrom in a light most supportive of the Trial Court's 
Findings. If there is a reasonable basis in evidence, the Trial 
Court will be affirmed on appeal. Even where there is disparity 
in issue, the Trial Court's Findings will not be set aside unless 
the strict standard and requirements placed upon the Appellant 
have been satisfied. See Davies v. Olson, 746 P. 2d 264, 70 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 42 (Ct. App. 1987); Salt Lake City School Dist. v. 
Galbraith & Green, 740 P.2d 284, 62 Utah Adv. Rep. 38 (Ct. App. 
1987) (It is not for the Court to substitute its judgment for 
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that of the Trial Court). 
And see Circle Airfreight v. Boyce Equipment, 74 745 P.2d 
828, 69 Adv. Rep. 39 (Ct. App. 1987), which held that the 
reviewing Court must give due regard to the opportunity of the 
Trial Court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and the 
Trial Court's Findings, if not against the clear weight of the 
evidence and not clearly erroneous, should not be disturbed on 
appeal. 
In light of the foregoing rules which apply to this case, it 
is clear that the Appellant has failed to meet her burden to 
challenge the Trial Court's Findings. A review of Appellant's 
Brief reveals that Sidwell has completely failed even to attempt 
to marshal the evidence which supports the Trial Court's 
Findings. In the foregoing portion of this Brief, Respondent 
Monroe has set forth some of the evidence which supports the 
Trial Court's Findings, but, as indicated in the Newmeyer and 
Fitzgerald cases, cited above, this burden is a requirement 
placed upon the Appellant, not the Respondent. Sidwell!s failure 
to meet that burden is a fatal flaw in her appeal. On that basis 
alone, her appeal must be rejected. 
Monroe submits that the reason why Appellant Sidwell has 
failed to marshal the evidence supporting the Trial Court's 
Findings is that if Sidwell had done so, the overwhelming support 
of the evidence would become apparent. Instead, Appellant 
Sidwell's has mischaracterizect the evidence and those Findings 
and then has attempted to attack the Findings on the basis of 
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inconsistencies which do not exist. As demonstrated above, there 
is substantial and competent evidence in the Record which 
supports each Finding of the Trial Court. 
Certainly, viewing all the evidence in the light most 
supportive of the Trial Court's Findings, no rationale exists for 
disturbing those Findings. This is especially true in this case 
where the Trial Court's Findings are based in large part upon the 
testimony of witnesses whose demeanor on the stand was directly 
observed by the Trial Court, and where the Appellant's main 
witness' credibility was cast into serious question. 
In summary, Appellant Sidwell has not met even the threshold 
test for challenging the Findings of the Trial Court. Moreover, 
Respondent Monroe (even though it does not have a burden to do so 
at this point) has demonstrated that those Findings are indeed 
supported by substantial competent evidence. 
II. AMPLE LEGAL PRECEDENT EXISTS WHICH SUPPORTS THE 
FLSA DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT IN THIS CASE. 
Monroe does not dispute the fact that the FLSA requires an 
employer to pay an employee minimum wage ($3.35 per hour) for all 
hours worked, nor does Monroe dispute that the law requires that 
time and one-half must be paid for hours worked in excess of 
forty in any one week. In this case, however, the question 
before the Trial Court was how many hours did Mrs. Sidwell 
actually work in any given week? Given the facts as found by the 
Trial Court, which were supported by substantial evidence in the 
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Record, the Trial Court properly applied the law in light of 
established precedents to determine that Monroe had correctly 
paid Mrs. Sidwell. 
It should be emphasized that Sidwell's appeal is based 
entirely upon the erroneous premise that the Findings of the 
Trial Court are invalid. Nothing in Sidwell's Brief indicates 
that, if the Trial Court's Findings are indeed correct (which 
they are) the appeal would nonetheless have merit. Hence, 
because those Findings are indeed correct, Sidwell1s appeal must 
fail. 
Regardless of the unsupported contentions of Appellant 
Sidwell regarding the Trial Court's Findings, there are 
sufficient undisputed facts which would nevertheless support the 
lower court's decision. For example, Sidwell's proposed 
Supplemental Findings of Fact (R. 208-11) admit that Mrs. Sidwell 
was expected to deal with trespassing after operating hours; that 
she was paid $355.00 per month; that her "active guard duties" 
totalled only seven hours and 50 minutes each week; that during 
the normal operating hours of the plant, she was completely free 
to pursue her own individual interests, including accepting full-
time employment with another employer and engaging in normal, 
private pursuits with complete freedom from all duties and 
responsibilities; that she was free to attend classes at the 
university and go to the symphony, etc. 
In light of such undisputed facts, legal authority supports 
the decision of the Trial Court. The federal regulation 
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applicable to this situation is 29 C.F.R. §785.23, which 
provides: 
Employees residing on employer's premises or working at 
home. 
An employee who resides on his employer's premises 
on a permanent basis or for extended periods of time is 
not considered as working all the time he is on the 
premises. Ordinarily, he may engage in normal private 
pursuits and thus have enough time for eating, 
sleeping, entertaining, and other periods of complete 
freedom from all duties when he may leave the premises 
for purposes of his own. It is of course difficult to 
determine the exact hours worked under these 
circumstances and any reasonable agreement of the 
parties which takes into consideration all of the 
pertinent facts will be accepted. This rule would 
apply, for example, to the pumper of a stripper well 
who resides on the premises of his employer and also to 
a telephone operator who has the switchboard in her own 
home. (Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 194 Okla. 183, 148 
P. 2d 182 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1944); Thompson v. Loring Oil 
Co.. 50 F. Supp. 213 (W.D. La. 1943) [Emphasis added.] 
Pursuant to the foregoing regulation, if Monroe and Mrs. 
Sidwell had a reasonable agreement regarding the conditions under 
which she would be compensated for the time she actually worked 
while living on the Monroe premises, such agreement would not be 
upset. In this case, the facts showed that such an agreement did 
exist: Monroe agreed to pay Mrs. Sidwell $355.00 per month plus 
furnish the space and utilities for her trailer (Tr. 154) (which 
utilities and space were worth a total of $123.00 additional 
compensation each month, Findings 18 and 19, Tr. 96, Ex. P-16) . 
The gross pay for Mrs. Sidwell of $478.00 each month was paid for 
active guard duties of between eight and ten hours per week 
(Finding 11). By simple mathematics, this means that Mrs. Sidwell 
was actually paid at least $11.03 per hour worked (12 months 
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times $478, divided by 10 hours times 52 weeks). In addition to 
the support of the above-cited regulation, established case 
precedent also supports the Trial Courtfs determination in this 
instance. For example, in Adklns v. Campbell Brown & Co., 189 F. 
Supp., 41 Labor Cases Par. 31,055 (S. D. W. Va. 1960), it was 
held that time spent by an employee on the property of an 
employer in the performance of a guard function did not 
constitute working time within the coverage of the FLSA, where 
the terms of the arrangement provided for the establishment of 
living quarters on the employer's property and for the guard to 
be seen about the property two or three times after operations 
had closed for the day in return for free living quarters, gas 
and electricity, pay at the rate of fifty dollars a month and 
enough odd jobs at the rate of one dollar per hour to bring his 
weekly earnings up to thirty-five or forty dollars per week. 
Although the presence of the guard on the employer's property in 
Adkins was intended as a precaution against vandalism, the time 
spent was not controlled by the employer and was found to be 
predominantly for the individual's own benefit. Under such 
circumstances, which are quite similar to those admitted to have 
existed here, the court in Adkins found no violation of the FLSA. 
See also, Skelly Oil Co. v. Jackson, 8 Labor Cases Par. 61. 133, 
148 P.2d 182 (Okla. 1944). In another similar case, the same 
result was reached. Cordell v. Wilcox Oil & Gas Co., 5 Labor 
Cases Par. 60,807 (D. Okla. 1941). In that situation, the 
employee was a "pumper" on an oil well property. The court 
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stated: 
A pumper on an oil well property usually lives in 
a house on the lease furnished by the oil company, and 
it is necessary that he spend almost all of his time on 
the lease in case something happens to the pumps; 
however, the testimony in this case shows that the 
pumper left the lease often to go to town, buy his 
groceries, take his children to school, etc. 
* * * 
Of course, all of these pumpers are required to be 
available on the lease for some period of time during 
the day other than the time during which they are 
actually required to perform some service for the 
employer. It is necessary for them to be available to 
take care of any breakdowns and attend to any trouble 
that might develop in connection with the pumping of a 
well. But I don't thing the law contemplates that an 
employee is to be compensated for all the time that he 
is reguired to be available there on the lease for work 
in the event something should develop that would 
reguire his attention. [Emphasis added.] 
The same conclusion was reached in Perry v. George P. Livermore, 
Inc. , 6 Labor Cases Par. 61,310 (Ct. App. Tex. 1942), which was 
another oil lease case. In that decision, the court stated: 
In harmony with the opinion of the [Wage and Hour] 
Administrator, as above expressed, we do not think it 
was contemplated by the Congress that such an employee 
as we have in this case should be compensated for the 
time he spent in sleeping, eating, relaxing, or 
otherwise engaging in entirely private pursuits, either 
on or off the premises of his employer. [Emphasis 
added.] 
The opinion referred to in the foregoing passage appeared as 
Interpretative Bulletin No. 13: 
In some cases employees are engaged in active work 
for part of the day but because of the nature of the 
job are also required to be on call for 24 hours a day. 
Thus, for example, a pumper of a stripper well often 
resides on the premises of his employer. The pumper 
engages in oiling the pump each day and doing any other 
necessary work around the well. In the event that the 
pump stops (at any time during the day or night) the 
pumper must start it up again. Similarly, caretakers, 
custodians, or watchmen of lumber camps during the off 
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season when the camp is closed, live on the premises of 
the employer, have a regular routine of duty, but are 
subject to call at any time in the event of an 
emergency. The fact that the employee makes his home 
at his employer's place of business in these cases does 
not mean that the employee is necessarily working 24 
hours a day. In the ordinary course of events, the 
employee has a normal night's sleep, has ample time in 
which to eat his meals and has a certain amount of time 
for relaxation and entirely private pursuits. In some 
cases the employee may be free to come and go during 
certain periods. Thus, here again the facts may 
justify the conclusion that the employee is not working 
at all times during which he is subject to call in the 
event of an emergency, and a reasonable computation of 
working hours in this situation will be accepted by the 
Division. [Emphasis added.] 
Here, as under the example cited in the Opinion, it was 
undisputed that Mrs. Sidwell in the ordinary course of events was 
able to have a normal night's sleep, eat her meals, relax, and 
enjoy private pursuits. Another case reaching a similar 
conclusion that not all the time in question should constitute 
working time is Brennan v. Williams Investment Co., Inc., 77 
Labor Cases Par. 33,254 (W.D. Tenn. 1975). See also, Wage and 
Hour Opinion Letter No. 600 (May 25, 1967), ruling that employees 
residing on the employer's premises, such as house mothers in the 
women's dormitories of colleges or universities, are not 
considered as working all the time while on the premises; and 
see Wage and Hour Opinion Letter No. 783 (April 1, 1968). 
The foregoing authorities demonstrate that virtually since 
the passage of the FLSA, the Agency and the courts have 
considered that employees who reside on the employer's premises 
are not to be regarded as working the entire time of their 
presence. In the present situation, which is factually very 
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similar to the example cited in the available precedent, Mrs. 
Sidwell was found to be engaged in "active guard duties" only for 
eight to ten hours per week. Under those circumstances, the 
arrangement agreed upon between Monroe and Sidwell was certainly 
reasonable and should not be upset. 
The cases cited in Sidwell's Brief are not applicable here. 
For example, Witt v. Skellv Oil Co. , 379 P.2d 61 (N.M. 1963), 
does not apply in this instance because the employee in that case 
was required to be on the premises during the entire weekend. 
Mrs. Sidwell, in contrast, was not required to be present 
throughout the weekend. Her duties consisted of only two rounds 
each weekend day (see Finding 6). At the same time, she was free 
on weekends to attend church, go to the symphony, and to come and 
go as she pleased. Similarly, the Craqo v. Rockwell Mfg. Co., 
301 F. Supp. 743 (D. Tenn. 1969), case also does not apply here. 
Mrs. Sidwell can hardly be described (as was the employee in 
Crago) as a "captive on the employer's premises for sixteen hours 
a day." In Mrs. Sidwell's own words, she was engaged in "active 
guard duties" only sever hours and 50 minutes each week (Ex. P-
12). Likewise, Marshall v. Nauta-Crete, Ltd., 82 Labor Law Rep. 
Par. 33,589 (D. Va. 1977), is not applicable because the two 
guards in that case were required to stay on the premises 
throughout the period of their service each weekend. An entirely 
different regulation applied in that case (29 C.F.R. §785.22, 
entitled "Where an employee is required to be on duty for 24 
hours or more"). Mrs. Sidwell was certainly not required to be 
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on duty 24 hours or more during any particular period of time. 
That was not her assignment, and even she doesn't claim that 
Monroe imposed such a requirement upon her. 
In anticipation of Monroe's Brief, Appellant attempts to 
wipe away the cases cited to the Trial Court by Monroe and also 
referred to above as supportive of the lower court's decision 
(see Sidwell Brief, p. 32). Appellant attempts to negate that 
authority by the cryptic assertion that "each of these cases 
turns upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of employment. 
No sweeping generalizations can be made.11 Despite the fact that 
those cases were cited to the Trial Court by Monroe in support of 
its decision, Appellant Sidwell makes no effort in her Brief to 
attempt to distinguish the facts of those cases from those 
present in the case at hand. Monroe submits that the reason 
Appellant fails to do so is because the facts of those case are 
amazingly similar to the present ease and simply cannot be 
distinguished on a factual basis. In addition, contrary to the 
generalization that "no generalizations can be made," it can be 
accurately stated that those cases to stand for several general 
propositions: Where employees reside on an employer's premises 
for extended periods of time, they are not considered to be 
working during all of such periods, particularly where they can 
engage in normal private pursuits and thus have time for eating, 
sleeping, entertaining, and enjoying other periods of complete 
freedom from all duties when they can leave the premises. In 
Mrs. Sidwell's case, as the Trial Court found, based upon 
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substantial evidence (including her own admissions), except for 8 
to 10 hours per week, Mrs. Sidwell was not working for Monroe. 
As stated above, similar cases applying the rules relating to 
employees who reside on their employers1 premises and are 
generally free to come and go as they please, are not considered 
working during such periods. Those cases offer significant 
support to the Conclusions reached by the Trial Court in this 
instance. 
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN HE FAILED TO TREBLE 
MONROC'S DAMAGES FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER. 
When the Trial Judge made his ruling on Monroe's request for 
treble damages, his statements from the bench indicated that he 
applied an incorrect rule of law in reaching his decision on this 
issue. His statement revealed that he believed that the statute 
required only that waste and damages to the premises be trebled. 
He equated rental payments owing before the notice of unlawful 
detainer was served with rents owing after the notice was served 
and the tenancy was ended. Monroe concedes that rent owing 
before the notice of unlawful detainer is not to be trebled. 
However, the reasonable value of the premises during the period 
of the unlawful detainer must be trebled under the statute. 
Judge Daniels1 comment on this issue appears in the Record 
at page 302: 
As I read the unlawful detainer statute, I don't 
think you treble the rent. I know it's very ambiguous, 
but I think it talks about awarding damages and 
awarding rent, and I don't think you treble the rent. 
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I think your treble damages that rises as a result of 
the unlawful detainer, and particular waste or damage 
that is done, so I'm not going to award treble damages 
on the unlawful detainer action. 
The Judge found that the notice of unlawful detainer was 
served on April 17, 1986. No rent is claimed by Monroe prior to 
that date. The Judge also found that the reasonable value of the 
premises during the unlawful detainer was $50.00 per month and 
that the unlawful detainer extended for six months. He refused 
to treble the total of six time fifty dollars, or $300.00. 
R.302. 
The leading case on this issue is Forrester v. Cook, 292 
Pac. 206 (Utah 1930). With respect to the issue of treble 
damages, that case presented an identical legal question to the 
one considered by this Court in his Memorandum Decision dated 
March 18, 1987. The holding of the Utah Supreme Court suggests 
that the Trial Court erred in reaching his conclusions in his 
bench ruling, cited above. It is appropriate that this Court now 
correct that error. 
The relevant portion of the Forrester case is quoted below 
(see 292 Pac. 213-14): 
The question may arise as to what is 
included within the term "damages11 [under the 
unlawful detainer statute]. It is contended 
by defendants that the basis of the judgment 
here is for rental value or reasonable rental 
value of the use and occupation of the 
premises and that this comes within the term 
"rents" as used in the statute, rather than 
"damages," and that rents cannot be trebled. 
The statute itself indicates the meaning of 
the terms wherein it says that the jury shall 
"also assess the damages occasioned to the 
plaintiff by any * * * unlawful detainer." 
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The word "rent" has reference to "the amount 
of any rent due, if the alleged unlawful 
detainer be after the default in the payment 
of rent." The rents here spoken of are rents 
which accrued before default. In the present 
action there are no rents accruing before 
forfeiture. The plaintiff is entitled to 
recover such damages as are the natural and 
proximate consequences of the unlawful 
detainer. Clearly the loss of the value of 
the use and occupation of the premises, or 
the rental value thereof during the period 
when the premises were unlawfully withheld 
from plaintiff, is a damage suffered here. 
While damages may not be restricted to the 
rental value and may include more, yet the 
rental value during the unlawful withholding 
of the premises is the minimum damages 
[Citations omitted.] Rent, which may not be 
trebled, are such as accrue before 
termination of the tenancy. After the 
tenancy has been terminated by the notice 
required by the statute, the person in 
unlawful possession is not owing rent under 
the contract, but must respond in damages 
pursuant to the law. Rental value or 
reasonable value of the use and occupation of 
the premises becomes an element of damages 
for retaining possession. This is not rent, 
it is damages. [Emphasis added.] 
Under the rule of Forrester as applied to the present 
factual situation, Mrs. Sidwell is liable for the rent due for 
the period from April 17, 1986, to October 30, 1986. The sums 
due following the service of the unlawful detainer notice do 
constitute "damages" incurred by Monroe and must be trebled under 
the statute. 
The Forrester decision has been consistently followed by the 
Utah Supreme Court. It has been cited as a clear statement of 
the law on this point in Utah. See, Lincoln Financial Corp. v. 
Ferrier, 567 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah 1977); Ute-Cal Land 
Development v. Intermountain Stock Exchange, 628 P.2d at 1282 
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(Utah 1981). Clearly, under Utah law as enunciated in the 
Forrester line of cases, a landlord is entitled to have 
considered as "damages" the reasonable rental value of the 
unlawfully detained premises for the time following the service 
of the unlawful detainer notice. 
Hence, Conclusion of Law No. 11 should be amended to provide 
that the damages incurred by reason of the unlawful detainer of 
$300.00 should be trebled, to total $900.00. 
Correspondingly, Paragraph 1 of the Judgment should be 
amended to read: "Judgment is entered in favor of plaintiff and 
against defendant in the amount of $900.00 as treble damages. 
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF REQUESTED 
Appellant Sidwell has entirely failed to meet her heavy 
burden of marshalling all the evidence sustaining the Trial 
Court's Findings and then overcoming the presumption in favor of 
those Findings by demonstrating why that evidence does not 
constitute competent substantial evidence supporting those 
Findings when such evidence is viewed in the most favorable light 
supporting those Findings. In addition, Appellant Sidwell has 
failed to show why, according to undisputed facts, the ruling of 
the Trial Court concerning her FLSA claim should be altered. 
Indeed, applicable case precedent more than justifies the Trial 
Court's decision. 
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On the other hand, the Trial Court was clearly in error when 
he failed to treble the damages incurred by Monroe relating to 
the value of the premises following the notice of unlawful 
detainer. 
On the basis of the foregoing and on the basis of the Record 
as a whole, Respondent Monroe submits that the appeal of Sidwell 
should be denied. The ruling of the Trial Court with respect to 
Mrs. Sidwellfs claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act should 
be affirmed. However, the ruling of the Trial Court with respect 
to Monroe's claim for treble damages should be reversed and the 
rule of the Forrester case, supra, should be applied, increasing 
the amount of the Judgment against Mrs. Sidwell to $900.00. 
Dated: February 24, 1988. 
Respectfully submitted, 
( Jcftin Paul Kennedy , \ 
VA^torney for Respondent Monroe 
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